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LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES
LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES IN TEXAS
LENNART VERNON LARSON*
INTRODUCTIONAPRIMARY characteristic of a trust relation is the separation
of legal and equitable title to property. The situation is one
in which one or more persons, called trustees, hold legal title to
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, in trust to
administer for the benefit of another person or persons, called
beneficiaries or cestuis que trust. The beneficiaries may have con-
current or successive rights to enjoy the benefits of the trust; in
either event, collectively they have the equitable (or beneficial)
title, as distinguished from the legal title vested in the trustee
or trustees.
The separation of legal and equitable title which occurs in a
trust transaction has many important consequences. Indeed, the
bulk of the law of trusts may be said to consist of rules and
doctrine derived by following the separation idea to its logical
conclusions. One aspect of the law of trusts which is shaped in
marked degree by the separation principle is the liability of trus-
tees in contract and in tort. It is proposed here to explain the
rules and policy governing liability of both private and chari-
table trustees as developed in Texas. The effect of recent legis-
lation will, of course, be considered.
LIABILITY OF PRIVATE TRUSTEES
In Contract. It is a well-settled rule that a trustee who does not
limit his responsibility is personally liable on his contracts.' This
is true as well where the contract is a proper one in the administra-
" B.S.. J.D., SJ.D.; Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University; member
of the Texas, Michigan, New Mexico and Washington Bars.
1 3 BOCERT, TRUSTS 711-713 (1946) ; 2 Scorr, TRUSTS" 261, 262 (1939) ; REmSvAT.
KENT, Tausrs § 261, 262, (1935).
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tion of the estate as where the contract is beyond the trustee's
authority. The liability attaches whether the trustee is known to
be acting in that capacity or not.
Texas cases have recognized and applied the rule imposing
personal liability upon the trustee. In Connally v. Lyons' defend-
ant was a court-appointed trustee of a business. Plaintiff sued for
personal judgment against defendant and recovered. The court
stated:
"That such trustees should be held personally liable is reasonable,
because they have in their own hands the means wherewith to reimburse
themselves, and should not assume a debt for the benefit of an estate of
which they have the sole benefit and control, without prospect of funds
for payment thereof... Purchases by trustees, when made in obedi-
ence to the trust, impose upon them a personal liability. The seller must
look to them for payment, and they must look to the trust estate for re.
imbursement.... Although the plaintiffs knew that the defendant was
conducting the mercantile business of which he had the control and
management as trustee for the benefit of the persons mentioned in the
[trust] conveyance... and charged the goods when sold... [to the
trading name under which the trust business was conducted], the de.
fendant was nevertheless personally liable to the plaintiffs for the price
of the goods... Since the trustee was personally liable, it was not neces-
sary that the beneficiaries should be made parties to the suit."'
Three other decisions have declared trustees personally liable on
their contracts, and in one of these the successful plaintiff was
a beneficiary of the trust.'
Personal liability was imposed upon the trustee for his con-
tracts at an early day because in the absence of special legisla-
tion the law courts could not contrive any other type of liability.
In many instances the person contracting with the trustee did not
'82 Tex. 664, 18 S. W. 799 (1891).
s Id. at 670, 671, 18 S. W. at 800, 801.
4Lon-hart Supply Co. v. Zweifel, 39 S. W. (2d) 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); J. P.
Webster & Sons v. Utopian Confectionery, 254 S. W. 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Head
v. Porter, 240 S. W. 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). In the first case cited defendant was
trustee under an assignment for benefit of creditors, and plaintiff was a creditor.
beneficiary who sold goods to the trustee after the assignment occurred.
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know of the trust, and there was firm ground in basic contract
principles to hold the trustee personally. Even if defendant were
known to be a trustee, the courts were unwilling, in the absence
of statute, to recognize him as anything other than a natural
person with the usual legal liabilities. This unwillingness pre-
vented levy of execution upon the trust corpus.5 The trustee did
not own the corpus beneficially, and his personal creditors, in-
cluding those with whom he dealt in the course of proper trust
administration, could not reach the corpus. This was something
of an anomaly: the trustee held legal title to trust property, he
was personally liable for debts incurred in proper trust administra.
tion, but the trust property was not subject to levy in satisfaction
of these debts.
A trustee has, of course, rights against the trust estate where
he finds himself personally liable on a contract entered into in the
course of proper trust administration. Broadly speaking, he has
a right of indemnity out of the trust estate, which embraces the
rights of exoneration and reimbursement. 6 Exoneration entitles
the trustee to use property in discharging properly incurred obli.
gations. Reimbursement entitles him to be paid out of trust
property for disbursements made in behalf of the trust estate.
The right of indemnity is secured by a lien which can be asserted
against trust property before it is transferred to the beneficiaries.
It is to be emphasized that these rights exist only as to contracts
properly entered into and that they are diminished to the extent
that the trust estate has claims against the trustee.
If the trustee has a right of reimbursement but the corpus is
insufficient to repay him, the trustee must suffer the loss. Cer.
tainly, the beneficiaries are not liable unless they were parties to
the original contract or agreed to indemnify the trustee.' The
53 BocmT, TRUSTS 712 (1946); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS 266, 308, 308.1 (1939); REsTATz-
MitT, TRUSTS §§ 266, 308 (1935).
6 3 BocET, TnUSTS 718 (1946) ; 2 ScoTT, TRUsTs 244, 244.1,244.3, 245, 246 (1939);
RFSTATEMENT, TRUSTS H§ 244-246 (1935).
I Everett v. Drew. 129 Mass. 150 (1880) ; Coffmn v. Gates. 110 Mo. App. 475, 85
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immunity of the beneficiaries from suit on debts incurred by the
trustee is a consequence of the separation of the legal and equit-
able title to the trust property. It is clear that a trustee should
think twice before incurring obligations which exceed the trust
corpus, even though the obligations may be perfectly proper in
the course of trust administration.
A major reason advanced for holding the trustee liable per-
sonally and denying direct recourse against the trust estate is the
desire to protect the interests of the beneficiaries. This end is
thought achieved by compelling the trustee to defend a suit which
imposes personal liability and to seek reimbursement if judg-
ment is obtained and satisfied out of his property. Presumably,
the trustee will be diligent to defend the suit, since his right of
reimbursement may be challenged in whole or in part by the bene-
ficiaries when he presents his accounts.
An express agreement that the trustee is not personally liable
is valid and does not contravene public policy, but a unilateral
declaration of nonliability, not known to the other party to a con-
tract, has no effect.' Mere knowledge by one party that the second
part to a contract is a trustee will not excuse the latter from per-
sonal liability.9 And, generally, designation of a party in the
contract instrument as a "trustee" is only descriptio personae and
does not affect his normal personal liability.1"
In special situations grounds may be found for allowing suit
in equity against the trustee in his official capacity and against
the trust estate. One of these is that in which the trustee contracts
S. W. 657 (1905) ; 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS 718, 721 (1946) ; 2 Scorr, TRUSTS 249, 275 (1939);
RESTATRMENT, TRUSTS § 249, 274, 275 (1935).
8 Longhart Supply Co. v. Zweifel, 39 S. W. (2d) 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Bank
of Washington v. San Benito & R. G. V. Ry. Co.. 293 S. W. 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
semble; J. P. Webster & Sons v. Utopia Confectionery, 254 S. W. 123 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923); 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS 714 (1946); 2 ScoTw, TRUSTS 263 (1939); RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 263 (1935).
9 Connally v. Lyons, 82 Tex. 664. 18 S. W. 799 (1891) ; Longbart Supply Co. v.
Zweifel, 39 S. W. (2d) 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
20 3 BocERT, TRUSTS 714 (1946) ; 2 Scowt, TRUSTS 262, 263 (1939) ; RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 262 (1935). Cf. Bank of Washington v. San Benito & R. G. Ry. Co., 293
S. W. 599 (Tex. Civ. Am. 1927)1.
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against personal liability and the obligation is incurred in the
course of proper trust administration. Beggs v. Fite" is illustra-
tive, although it did not involve an equitable suit. Certain disin-
herited heirs sued to annul a will under which defendants were
named as executors and trustees. Defendants contracted with Slay
and Simon, attorneys, to represent them in the proceedings, and,
subsequently, a large fee was earned. Plaintiff sued Slay and
Simon for debt and sought to garnishee defendant executors and
trustees for effects held for or owing to Slay and Simon. In dis-
cussing the contract between defendants and Slay and Simon the
Texas Supreme Court said:
"This... contract was oral, and was made with Tina Brooker et al.
in their representative capacities as trustees and executors of the J. N.
Brooker estate. In this contract it was expressly agreed that Tina
Brooker et al. were each and all contracting as trustees and executors,
and were binding themselves only as such, and that they were not con-
tracting personally at all, or binding themselves personally in any way.
In other words, the legal effect of the terms of this later contract was to
bind the estate of J. N. Brooker, deceased, and also to bind the makers
on the part of such estate in their representative capacities as trustees
and executors of such estate only." 12
Judgment for defendants was affirmed because they had been
served personally and not in their capacities as executors and
trustees. If defendants had been served in their representative
capacities, the great likelihood is that they would have been
obliged to pay to plaintiff out of the trust estate the debt owed to
Slay and Simon. 3
Considerable authority may be found that in special situations
"1 130 Tex. 46, 106 S. W. (2d) 1039 (1937). aDfg 79 S. W. (2d) 642 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934).
321d. at 48. 49, 106 S. W. (2d), at 1040.
13 On this point the court of civil appeals declared: "We think such trustees are
subject to garnishment. The funds of the estate in their hands are not in custodia legia.
. . .The trustees employed these attorneys and agreed to pay them only out of the
funds of the Brooker estate. The agreement of Slay & Simon that they would seek
compensation only from a particular fund in the control of the trustees does not alter
the fact that within those limits the trustees are obligated to pay." (79 S. W. (2d)
at 643).
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an equitable action may be brought by a creditor against a trustee
in his representive capacity and the trust property reached:"
where the trustee is insolvent and personal judgment against him
has proved, or will prove, fruitless; where the trust instrument
provides expressly that obligations incurred in trust administra-
tion are to be paid from trust assets, or where explicit provision
is made for indemnification of the trustee on such obligations;
where the trust corpus is a business; where the trust estate has
increased or benefited from the contract; or where the trustee
contracts expressly that his right of indemnity against the trust
estate may be reached. Some of these situations are complicated
by the principle that the creditor's right is derived from the trus-
tee's right of indemnity and is defeated if the trustee, because
of other defaults, has no such right.
The nature of the situations indicates a trend in the direction
of finding a reason for allowing direct recourse to trust funds
by creditors. Where the law remedy against the trustee personally
is inadequate, one can hardly maintain the position that the trust
corpus should remain beyond reach. Where the settlor expresses
himself that trust funds should be used to pay obligations properly
incurred by the trustee, his wish should be followed, as it would
be with respect to other instructions in the trust instrument. Where
the trust corpus is a business, one may argue that normal liabil-
ities should be imposed upon the business property. To the extent
that the corpus is increased, at least, it should be answerable on a
contract claim. Where the trustee contracts to give the creditor his
right of indemnity (or contracts against personal liability), it is
no great step to allow a direct proceeding against the trust res.
In jurisdictions combining law and equity less difficulty is en-
countered in permitting recourse against the trustee in his repre-
sentative capacity and against the trust estate.
A few jurisdictions have dispensed with the necessity of finding
14 Mason v. Pomeroy, 151 Mass. 164, 24 N. E. 202 (1890); Jessup v. Smith, 223
N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403 (1918); 3 BocERT, TRusTs 715. 716, 723 (1946); 2 Scow,
TRusTs 267-271 (1939) ; REsTATrEmET. TRUSTS H 267-271 (1935).
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special circumstances and have adopted the rule that the trustee
may be served in his official capacity and the trust fund reached
directly.' Usually the adoption has come about through legisla-
tive enactment. Texas is a jurisdiction in which the rule was
adopted without the aid of statute. In a tort case decided in 1926,'
presently to be discussed, the Texas Supreme Court held that
trustees could be sued in their representative capacities and the
trust property levied upon directly. It is inconceivable that a dif-
ferent rule would have applied to contract cases. However, no
case involving the application of this rule to contract liability
reached the appellate courts.
The Texas Trust Act17 permits suit against a' trustee in his official
capacity, and the comment has been made that in this respect the
prior Texas law was not changed."8 Section 19A of the Act states
that whenever a trustee enters into a proper contract and a cause
of action accrues against him, he may be sued "in his representa-
tive capacity, and any judgment rendered in such action in favor
of the plaintiff shall be collectible by execution out of the trust
property." In the action "the plaintiff need not prove that the
trustee could have secured reimbursement from the trust fund
if he had paid the plaintiff's claim." Section 19C preserves the
personal liability of the trustee if the contract does not exclude
such liability. The addition of the words "trustee" or "as trustee"
after the signature of a trustee is to be deemed "prima facie evi-
dence of an intent to exclude" personal liability of the trustee.
Section 19B sets up procedural safeguards for the protection
of beneficiaries. Plaintiff cannot secure judgment unless within
thirty days after beginning his action (or within such other time
as the court may fix) and more than thirty days before obtaining
judgment he notifies each beneficiary of the existence and nature
V 3 BOCERT. TRUSTS 712 (1946) ; 2 ScOTr, TRUSTS 271A, 271A.1 (1939).
26 Ewing v. Win. L. Foley, Inc., 115 Tex. 222, 280, S. W. 499 (1926), modifying 239
S. W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
1? Tex. Laws 1943. c. 148; amended. Tex. Laws 1945, c. 77; added to, Tex. Laws
1947, c. 209; Trnx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 7425b-1--48.
19 Boylev, Texas Trust Act 6 T. B. Joua. 149 (1943)
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of the action. The notice must be given by mailing copies thereof
by registered mail. The trustee is under a duty to furnish the
plaintiff with a list .of beneficiaries and their addresses upon
written request, and notification of these parties constitutes com-
pliance with the section. Any beneficiary may intervene and con-
test the right of the plaintiff to recover.
It is noteworthy that plaintiff's recourse against the trust fund
is independent of whether or not the trustee would have a right
of reimbursement if he paid the judgment. There is little or no
justification for frustrating the claim of an innocent creditor be-
cause the trustee has been guilty of breaches of trust which would
cancel out his right of indemnity if he paid the claim. The inno-
cent creditor cannot be expected to know of the breaches, and to
decide the success of his claim on the basis of their existence vel
non seems technical and arbitrary.
Also noteworthy is the change in the common law rule that
the addition of words such as "trustee" or "as trustee" to a signa-
ture is a mere descriptio personae. Under the statute the words
are prima facie indicative of an intent to exclude personal lia-
bility.
In Tort. The rules governing liability of a trustee in tort parallel
to a considerable extent those governing his liability in contract.
The trustee, whether known as such or not, is liable personally for
torts committed in the course of trust administration, and the trust
fund cannot be reached.19 Where the trustee himself commits the
tort, no difficulty is felt in holding him responsible personally.
Where his agent or servant commits the tort, one may feel a hesi-
tancy to hold the trustee personally, since he is not in the posi-
tion of a man conducting a business for private profit. But it is
well-settled that respondeat superior applies, and the general
opinion has been that there is no sufficient reason for relieving
1g Smith v. Rizzuto, 133 Neb. 655, 276 N. W. 406 (1937); Parmenter v. Barstow,
22 R. 1. 245, 47 ALI. 365 (1900) ; Kirchner v. Muller. 280 N. Y. 23, 19 N. E. (2d) 665
(1939); 3 BocERT, TRUSTS 731 (1946); 2 SCOTT, Tauss 264 (1939); RRSTATMENT.
TRusTs I 264 (1935).
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a private trustee from liability for the acts and omissions of his
subordinates.
A trustee has a right of indemnity (exoneration and reimburse-
ment) from the trust estate with respect to torts committed in the
course of trust administration, provided that he has not been at
fault personally. 0 This may well occur where the tort is com-
mitted by a servant or agent and the trustee has not been at fault
in directing, participating in, or ratifying the tortious act or in
hiring or retaining the tortfeasor. It may also occur in certain
instances where tort liability is imposed upon the legal owner of
property without fault on his part.2"
If trust funds are adequate to indemnify the trustee, no injustice
is worked in holding the trustee liable personally for torts com-
mitted without his fault. But if the funds are inadequate, an
argument may be made against liability in excess of the available
funds. The argument has been unsuccessful, and one of the risks
assumed by the trustee is that he may incur tort liability which
exceeds the value of the trust res. The situation is comparable to
that in which the trustee enters into contract which may result in
an obligation exceeding the amount of available trust funds.
The question whether trustees can contract in such a way as to
relieve themselves from personal liability for tort was presented
in Fisheries Co. v. McCoy.22 Plaintiff was injured through the
negligence of defendant trustees in failing to afford him with safe
appliances and a reasonably safe place in which to work. When
he accepted employment, plaintiff acknowledged the nonliability
of the individual defendants and agreed to look to the assets of
the trust only for any debts or damages. Plaintiff recovered a
$20,000 judgment against all the defendants, which was affirmed
20 BoGoT, TtusTs 734 (1946) ; 2 Scorr, TRUSTS 247, 264 (1939) ; RESTATEMENT,
TRUsTS § 247 (1935).
21 Smith v. Rizzuto. 133 Neb. 655. 276 N. W. 406 (1937) : 3 BocErr. TRusTs 734
(1946); 2 Scorr, TaUSTS 247, 248, 264 (1939); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §i 247, 248,
264 (1935).
n 202 S. W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). writ ol error dismissed.
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on appeal. The court of civil appeals discussed the contract signed
by plaintiff in the following terms:
"We shall take it for granted that there is a general rule that trustees
and partners can, by previous contract, exempt themselves from per-
sonal liability for contracts and torts, and consider whether such a
contract, when made with an employe for exemption from personal
liability for negligence of other employes to him, has the effect of mak-
ing the trustees or partners his masters only in their official or repre-
sentative capacity and not as individuals. The question, we believe,
resolves itself into whether trustees or partners can by contract alter the
legal status which the law gives them, and such question must be an-
swered in the negative. Under the law, trustees and partners are persons.
They may describe themselves as trustees or partners in making con-
tracts, and sign as trustees and partners, and yet it is their personal
contract. They have no separate legal entity as trustees or partners.
When they employ a person they are his masters. They may say in a
contract with him that they are not his masters, and that the trust estate
or partnership estate is his master; but property and funds cannot be
his master. There must be persons, natural or artificial. In this case
there is no corporation, so Munn and Moody were masters personally,
regardless of how explicitly they might have expressed an intention to
employ only in a representative capacity.52 3
The court pointed out that limited liability for contracts and torts
can be achieved by taking advantage of the laws relating to in-
corporation and the formation of limited partnerships. No peculiar
merit could be found in the trust or partnership enterprise involved
in the case such that the contract provision should be allowed
to modify a liability normally incident to a master and servant
relationship. Accordingly, the provision was held contrary to
public policy and void.
Authority exists that in special situations the trustee can be
sued in equity in his representative capacity and the trust corpus
reached:2 where the trustee is insolvent and the law remedy against
23 Id. at 348.
24 Smith v. Coleman, 100 Fla. 1707, 132 So. 198 (1930) ; Birdsong v. Jones. 222 Mo.
App. 768, 8 S. W. (2d) 98 (1928) ; 3 BocErT, TRUSTS 732 (1946) ; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS 267-
271 (1939) ; RESTATEWMENT, TRUSTS § 267-271 (1935).
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him is inadequate; where the trust instrument provides expressly
that obligations incurred in trust administration are to be paid
from trust assets, or where explicit provision is made for indem-
nification of the trustee on such obligations; where the corpus of
the trust is a business; or where the trust estate has increased or
benefited from the tort. The reasons for allowing direct recourse
in these situations are similar to those operating in the comparable
contract situations. Again, the tort claimant's recourse is regarded,
in some of the situations, as derived from the trustee's right of in-
demnity and limited to that extent.
A few jurisdictions allowed direct recourse against the trustee,
as such, and his estate, apparently without limitation to special
circumstances." Texas was one of these, and no statute was relied
upon to reach this result. In Ewing v. Wm. L. Foley, Inc.2" defend-
ant executors and trustees were erecting an eight-story building
in Houston. Defendants' agents negligently undermined plaintiff's
building, causing the northeast wall to crash and fall. Defendants
were not personally negligent. Plaintiff sued defendants per-
sonally and in their official capacities and recovered judgment for
$18,500. The trial court directed that execution be levied upon
the trust estate because the trustees would have a right of indem-
nity if they paid the judgment. The Texas Supreme Court af-
firmed this judgment saying:
"The holding that a trustee, in cases where he is not chargeable with
personal fault or negligence, may legally be reimbursed out of the trust
estate for such damages as may be recovered against him, is in effect a
holding that in such cases the trust estate is itself liable for such dam-
ages, and, since the trust estate is so liable, we think our practice allows
it to be proceeded against in a suit brought directly against the trustee
in his representative capacity. ''2
25 In re Hunter, 151, Fed. 904 (E. D. Pa. 1907); Miller v. Smythe. 92 Ga. 154, 18
S. E. 46 (1893); in re Raybould. [1900] 1 Ch. 199; 2 BoCEa'T, Tausms 432 (1946) ; 2
ScoTT, Tnusrs 271A, 271A.2 (1939).
26 115 Tex. 222. 280 S. W. 499 (1926). modifying 239 S. W. 251 (Tex. Civ App.
1922).
21Id. at 234. 280 S. W. at 502. 503.
1949]
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The court reviewed various authorities and asserted that the rule
adopted was supported by the common law. It argued that where
the trustee has exercised care and prudence in selecting agents,
has acted in good faith, and has been guilty of no personal negli-
gence or fault, "it would be a harsh and most unjust result that
would hold the trust estate free from liability and would hold him
personally liable for damages for the torts of such agent, with no
right of indemnity or reimbursement out of such estate."2 In many
instances, said the court, the rule "would wholly defeat recovery
for the injury done when the trustee or trustees were insolvent or
without funds." 9 These arguments seemed based on the fallacious
premise that the rule imposing personal liability denied the right
of indemnity to guiltless trustees and forbade recourse against the
trust estate where the trustees were insolvent.
All the authorities cited by the Texas Supreme Court to sup-
port its holding in the Foley case were examined and found want-
ing in an article written some twenty years ago. 0 The writer con-
cluded, however, that "the result of the case is a progressive one,
but rather than conforming to, it seems to depart from the com-
mon law, and is supported on reasoning rather than authority."
Certainly, if the beneficiaries have an opportunity to protect their
interests, there would seem to be a marked policy advantage in
avoiding circuity of action and allowing direct recourse against
trust funds.
Section 21 of the Texas Trust Act appears to codify the law
of the Foley case and affords some clarification. Personal liability
of the trustee for torts committed by him or his agents and servants
is preserved in Section 21D. Section 21A allows suit against the
trustee in his representative capacity and collection from the trust
property (1) if the tort was a common incident of the kind of
activity in which the trustee was properly engaged for the trust;
2s Id. at 228. 280 S. W. at 500.
29 Ibid.




or (2) if the tort was not a common incident of such activity and
neither the trustee nor any officer or employee was guilty of action-
able negligence; or (3) if the tort does not fall in classes (1) or
(2) and increases the value of the trust property. As to the third
situation, collection may be had only to the extent of permanent
increase in the value of the property.
Section 21B eliminates the necessity for proving, as a condition
precedent to bringing suit against the trustee in his representative
capacity, that the trustee would have a right of reimbursement if
he paid the tort claim. The Act takes the view that loss by a trustee
of his right of indemnity for tort liability because of breaches of
trust is irrelevant to the question whether the tort claimant may
reach the trust estate. Section 21C requires that notice be given
to all beneficiaries of a trust before judgment is obtained against
the trustee in his official capacity. The provisions for written de-
mand for names of beneficiaries, for time limits, for notification,
and for the right of beneficiaries to intervene are similar to those
set forth in Section 19, dealing with contractual liability of
trustees.
Section 20 is closely related to Section 21 and provides for
the trustee's right of indemnity. The trustee has a right of exonera-
tion or reimbursement (1) if the tort was a common incident
of the kind of business activity in which the trustee was properly
engaged for the trust; or (2) if the tort was not such a common
incident and neither the trustee nor any officer or employee was
guilty of actionable negligence. It is to be observed that in the
first situation the trustee's right of indemnity apparently is not
barred by his negligence or fault. If the tort does not fall within
either of the two situations, the trustee has a right of exoneration
or reimbursement only to the extent that the trust property has
been increased in value because of the tort.
Satisfaction is to be expressed with the rules and principles
incorporated into Sections 19, 20 and 21 of the Texas Trust Act.
The personal liability of the trustee in tort and in contract re-
1949]
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mains, but there is added the remedy of suit against him in his
representative capacity. Circuity of action is avoided, and the bene-
ficiaries are afforded the opportunity to intervene. Internal con-
sistency is to be seen in Sections 20 and 21 in that the situations
in which a trustee can claim a right of indemnity for personal
liability for tort are exactly the situations in which he can be sued
in his representative capacity.
LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE TRUSTEES
In Contract. A charitable trustee is liable in contract in the
same way as is a private trustee.3 He is liable personally, whether
known to be a charitable trustee or not, and whether the contract
is a proper one in the course of trust administration or not. If the
contract is a proper one, the charitable trustee has a right to
indemnity from the trust estate. And the charitable trustee can
contract expressly against personal liability. It appears that the
trust res can be reached by a contract creditor in the same special
situations where such recourse can be had against private trust
funds. No reason appears that a charitable trustee's contractual
liability should be different in nature from that of a private
trustee.
Only one Texas case deals with the contractual liability of
charitable trustees, and it suggests that trust funds devoted to
particular charitable purposes cannot be reached for debts in-
curred in transactions unrelated to the particular charitable pur-
poses."2 In the case plaintiffs, agents for the Methodist Episcopal
Church South, bought land and established the Waco Female
College. Plaintiffs sued the church (a voluntary association),
members of the church, five incorporated colleges, and trustees
of the colleges for reimbursement in the amount of $37,000. The
church held no property in its own name, but property was held
3 2 BoGEJT, TRUSTS 402 (1935); 3 Scorr, TRusrs 403 (1939); RsmENT .
TRUSTS § 403 (1935).
32 Methodist Episcopal Church South v. Clifton, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 248, 78 S. W.
732 (1904), writ of error rejused.
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for its use by charitable corporations and boards of trustees.
Plaintiffs recovered judgment for $37,000 against the church,
its members, and trustees of the Waco Female College, but with
a direction that levy should be made upon church property only
and not upon property of the individual members. On appeal the
judgment was reversed. The Methodist Episcopal Church South,
as a voluntary association, could not be sued. The individual
members and the colleges could not be sued because plaintiffs
were not their agents. Nothing was left of the Waco Female Col.
lege property. There remained the possibility of reaching prop-
erty of individual Methodist churches. Also, it appeared that
property was held by certain trustees for school and church
purposes in behalf of the Methodist Episcopal Church South and
the Northwest Texas Conference. With respect to these possibil-
ities the court said:
"In our opinion, the verdict of the jury makes it clear that the church
now holds no property directly connected with the enterprise for which
the indebtedness of appellees was incurred; that it holds no property as
a general fund of the association, which might be charged in equity with
this debt; but that all of the property controlled by it, or held for its
use, is charged with particular charitable uses, separate and distinct
from the Waco Female College, and which cannot be lawfully diverted
from the purposes for which it was donated.
83
Generally, a charitable trustee cannot be sued in his official ca-
pacity and trust property levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment
on contract, in the absence of special circumstances.' In Texas,
however, if one can believe that private trustees could be sued in
their representative capacities on contract obligations,"s the same
should have been true of charitable trustees. This seems to be con-
firmed in the Texas Trust Act.
Section 19 has already been discussed as providing for suit
33 Id. at 255. 78 S. W. at 736.
342 BocisT, TausTs 402 (1935); 3 Scowr, TRusUs 403 (1939); RESTATEMENT,
TRusTs § 403 (1939).
ss See text at notes 16 and 26 supra.
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against a trustee in his official capacity on contract obligations.
The section is not limited in terms to private trustees. Section
19B directs that notice of action be given to the Attorney General
and to any corporate beneficiaries in the case of charitable trusts.
The Attorney General and the corporate beneficiaries are au-
thorized to intervene and contest the suit. One cannot question that
charitable trustees can be sued in their representative capacities
in contract actions.
In Tort. A charitable trustee is liable personally for tort only
if he has been at fault in directing, participating in or ratifying
a wrongful act or omission or has been at fault in hiring or retain-
ing an employee. If he has not been at fault, he is not liable per-
sonally. He is not liable for the torts of his agents and servants
because respondeat superior does not apply. Neither he nor any
other private individual stands to gain from the administration
of the trust (often he serves without compensation), and thus a
main ground for holding a principal or master for the wrongs of
his agent or servant is missing. People would be discouraged from
acting as charitable trustees if they were held for torts without
personal fault.
There is general agreement on these propositions bearing on
the trustee's personal liability, but on the question of suing the
trustee in his offical capacity and reaching the trust corpus the
cases are characterized by diversity and confusion.36 Some courts
extend complete immunity to the charitable trust so long as the
trustee has not personally been at fault. If such fault is shown,
the trust res can be reached as well as the private property owned
by the trustee. Other courts allow suit against a charitable trustee
in his official capacity for all torts and extend no exemption.
Most courts allow to charitable funds a qualified immunity
from suit, depending on the situation of the plaintiff. If the
s Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E. 855 (1906); Welch v. Frisbie Me-
morial Hospital, 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. (2d) 761 (1939) ; 2 BoGERjT, TRUSTS 401 (1935) ;
3 ScoTT, TRUSTS 402-402.2 (1939); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 402 (1935); Appleman,
The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions 22 A. B. A. J. 48 (1936); Note 20 TEx. L
R r. 505 (1942).
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plaintiff is a beneficiary of the charitable trust, he is commonly
denied recourse against the trustee in his official capacity and
against the trust property, unless the trustee has been personally
at fault. If the plaintiff is a third party unconnected with the
charity, he is commonly permitted to reach the trust res. If the
plaintiff is an employee of the charity, the tendency is to permit
recovery and levy upon the trust fund. The cases are complicated
by the fact that in most of them charitable corporations are in.
volved as distinguished from charitable trustees. However, it is
said that a charitable trustee is in the same comparable position
as a charitable corporation (a legal entity) and that the rules
governing tort liability of both are the same."
The origin of the immunity of charitable trusts from tort lia-
bility has been traced to an early decision and certain dicta of
the English courts.3s The .decision and the dicta have been over-
ruled, but the doctrine has flourished and had strong support in
American law. Several reasons are advanced for allowing absolute
or qualified immunity. The "trust fund" theory is that the corpus
should not be diverted from the charitable purposes impressed
upon it by the settlor. Charitable donors would be discouraged
from their good works if they understood that their gifts could
be reached to pay tort laimants. Respondeat superior is not ap-
pticable because it is based on the idea that the principal is
making a private gain from the acts of his agents and servants
and should therefore be liable for their wrongs. Suit may be
brought against the individual agent or servant; the fact that he
is judgment proof is irrelevant, since the law does not guarantee
a solvent judgment debtor. Municipal corporations in performing
the same functions and achieving the same ends as charitable
trustees are deemed to be acting in a governmental capacity and
*1See Farrigan v. Pevea, 193 Mann. 147, 78 N. E. 855. 856 (1906) ; Ewing v. Win. L
Foley. Inc.. 239 S. W. 251. 254. 255 (Tcz. Civ. App. 1922); 2 BocEnT, TRUSTS 401
(1935); 3 Scorr, TRUSTS 402.2 (1939); RrSTATEMFNT, ThuSTs § 402, Comment h
(1935).
38 See Comment 9 Univ. or Prr. L REv. (1948) 253; 3 ScOn, Tausms 402 (1939).
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are allowed immunity from tort claims.' Charitable trustees are
in a position to urge that they should have the same immunity.
If a beneficiary of the charity is plaintiff, it is said that he waives
any claims for tortious injuries. It is said, too, that the beneficiary
"initiates" the course of conduct which leads to his injury. Finally,
there is a fear that if charitable trustees and corporations are made
subject to suits in tort, the bars will be down and they will be fair
game for all manner of tort claimants, good and bad. Private
corporations and public utilities can stand this, but not charities.
The reasons for immunity have been pretty well exploded. If
the "trust fund" theory is valid, then there would seem to be no
basis for recourse against the corpus, as is commonly allowed,
when the trustee has been personally at fault. It is not clear that
charitable donors expect their gifts to be immune from the hazards
of normal legal liability, and such gifts have not disappeared in
jurisdictions denying immunity. The argument may well be made
that a trustee in administering the business of a charitable trust
ought to be liable in that capacity in the same way as a private
owner. Charities will be stimulated to exercise all the care re-
quired of private persons. Respondeat superior is not based en-
tirely on the assumption that private gain is to ensue from the
actions of agents and servants. A tort claimant is no less injured
because the tortfeasor was an agent or servant of a charity. He
is compelled to make an unreasonable contribution to the charity
in being denied the right to bring an action.
Municipal corporations are not an apt subject for comparison
because they have attributes of sovereignty when acting in a gov-
ernmental capacity, and special considerations, among them his-
torical, are applicable. Besides, the immunity from suit is broader
than that extended to charities: it operates upon all classes of tort
claimants (beneficiary, employee or third party), bars suit upon
89 Gartman v. City of McAllen. 130 Tex. 237. 107 S. W. (2d) 879 (1937) aJ'g 81
S. W. (2d) 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); City of Dallas v. Smith. 130 Te. 225. 107
S. W. (2d) 872 (1937). reversing 78 S. W. (2d) 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ; City of
Wichita Falls v. Robison. 121 Tex. 133. 46 S. W. (2d) 965 (1932).
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contract as well as tort, and is not affected by the fact that an ex-
ecutive officer has been at fault in selecting the tortfeasor as an
employee. The waiver theory can only be urged against a com-
plaining beneficiary, and it seems unrealistic in the case of a pay-
ing beneficiary or a beneficiary who is unconscious or incompetent.
Indeed, waiver is a pure fiction where severe injury or death is
suffered by reason of negligence or other fault of employees of
a charity. One may query whether a beneficiary or a charity
"initiates" the course of conduct which leads to injury.
The danger of many unwarranted suits is probably exaggerated.
Charities do not stand in the same light as private corporations
and public utilities, and sympathy for the alleged victim of wrong
would be balanced by due regard for the public interest in char-
itable trusts. In sum, the arguments for making charities liable
in the same way as private individuals may be epitomized in the
expression that "charity begins at home"; care should first be taken
of those with whom the charity comes into tortious contact as it
goes about its ministrations.
Texas cases adopted the view that charitable corporations and
trustees should be allowed a qualified immunity from suit on tort
claims, and most or all of the arguments already stated have been
advanced. The qualified immunity allowed, however, is different
in its details from that prevailing in most states.
Beneficiaries of a charitable trust cannot sue in tort unless the
trustee (or corporation) was negligent in hiring or retaining the
employee committing the wrong.4" All of the Texas cases have
involved hospitals, and this result has been reached even though
plaintiff was a paying patient. The character of the defendant
40 Texas Cent. R. Co. v. Zumwalt. 103 Tex. 603. 132 S. W. 113 (1910). reversing
56 Tex. Civ. App. 567, 121 S. W. 1133. 132 S. W. 112 (1909) ; Steele v. St. Joseph's
Hospital, 60 S. W. (2d) 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). writ of error refused; Enell v.
Baptist Hospital, 45 S. W. (2d) 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). writ of error refused; Baylor
University v. Boyd, 18 S. W. (2d) 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). noted in 8 TEx. L. REv.
297 (1930); Koenig v. Baylor Hospital, 10 S. W. (2d) 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928);
Barnes v. Providence Sanitarium. 229 S. W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), writ of error
.dismissed; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Hanway. 57 S. W. 695 (Tex Civ. App. 1900),
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 94 Tex. 76. 58 S. W. 724 (1900).
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raises the immunity, and a paying patient may receive some
benefits (facilities and services) which are available and compen-
sated for only because of the charitable gift. Defendant has the
burden of proving that it is a charitable corporation (or charitable
trustee), since the facts are peculiarly within its knowledge." It
appears that evidence of negligence committed by an employee is
insufficient of itself to impose liability upon a charitable trustee or
corporation, since such evidence has no tendency to prove negli-
gence on the part of the trustee or corporation "in the failure to
prescribe proper rules of government or in the selection or reten-
tion of the offending... [employee].""' In other words, the bur-
den of proof is on the plaintiff to show negligence in selection or
retention.
St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson3 was a case in which the
evidence was held sufficient to sustain a judgment that negligence
had occurred in the selection of an agent. Plaintiff's wife, a paying
patient, was operated upon in defendant hospital. The head nurse
gave a general direction to the kitchen to send a bottle of hot water
to the room assigned to plaintiff's wife. A girl of twelve or four-
teen years, employed in the kitchen, put the bottle under the cover
on the bed and left. Plaintiff's wife was brought in and put to bed
in an unconscious condition. Two student nurses were successively
in charge of the patient, and the bottle of hot water was finally
discovered when plantiff's wife began squirming with pain. Plain-
tiff sued and recovered damages for severe injuries and burns.
suffered.
The court of civil appeals in affirming the judgment below recog-
nized that the authorities were divided on the question of extending
immunity to charitable institutions for tortious injuries to em-
ployees and third parties. As to beneficiaries who are injured the
court said:
41 Barnes v. Providence Sanitarium, 229 S. W. 588, 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921),
writ of error dismissed.
62 Steele v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 60 S. W. (2d) 1083. 1087 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
writ of error refused.
43 164 S. W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). writ o/ error refused.
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"There is yet another line of cases that do not concede entire exemp-
tion from the rule of respondeat superior, nor yet bring such.institu-
tions entirely within the rule, but hold to the rule that charitable
institutions, such as appellant, in respect to the negligence of physi-
cians, nurses, and servants, who are said not to be the agents of the
institution, are liable only when it appears that the institution failed
to exercise ordinary care in the selection and retention of such em-
ployes, and that in the application of the rule it is immaterial whether
the patient upon whom the injury was inflicted be a beneficiary of the
charity of the institution or-one who is paying full consideration for his
or her care and nursing.""
In Hotel Dieu v. Armendarez" the Texas Supreme Court held
that a religious corporation was liable to an employee for injuries
sustained because of breach of duty owed in a master-servant rela-
tion. Defendant operated a hospital, and plaintiff was employed in
the laundry. Plaintiff's hand was drawn into the revolving rollers
of a mangle while she was releasing some entangled garments.
Defendant was found negligent in failing to warn plaintiff of the
dangers incident to operation of the mangle and in failing to in-
struct her how to release entangled clothes. The court did not
discuss the policy of allowing immunity to a charitable corporation
but contented itself with the statement that the question had been
correctly decided below. The court of civil appeals had said:
"The law of master and servant, involving the duties it imposes on
the master and his liability for injuries resulting from the nonobserv-
ance of such duties, permeates and reaches every situation in the affairs
of men in which that relation is assumed .... [Hiad this corporation
derived no revenues from its operations, and [were] the funds which
enabled it to carry on its benefactions... derived, not from its
beneficiaries, but from endowments or contributions, it would not in
our opinion make a particle of difference in its attitude to the law with
reference to its legal duties and liabilities to persons in its service as
employes. It was an incorporated body, chartered by its own volition,
endowed with power to employ servants, and with the capacity to sue
-Id. at 39.
,5 210 S. W. 518 (Te=. Com. App. 1919). af'g 167 S. W. 181 (Tei. Civ. App. 1914)
and 145 S. W. 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
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and to be sued... This being so, defendant would be liable for injury
sustained by its employes due to the negligence, if any, of itself, its man-
aging officers, or agents or vice principals, which is the case presented
here.""4
The question of liability of a charity to a third person was
decided in Southern Methodist University v. Clayton.' Plaintiff
sued for injuries sustained by his wife when a temporary bleacher
in defendant's football stadium collapsed. Defendant's employee
was found negligent in permitting the bleacher to be overcrowded,
in failing to brace it, and in constructing it of defective materials.
But no assertion or proof was made that defendant had been negli-
gent in hiring or retaining the employee in question. In denying
recovery to plaintiff the Texas Supreme Court relied upon and
quoted from a South Carolina decision:
"... [T] he exemption of public charities from liability in actions for
damages for tort rests not upon the relation of the injured person to the
charity, but upon grounds of public policy, which forbids the crippling
or destruction of charities which are established for the benefit of the
whole public to compensate one or more individual members of the
public for injuries inflicted by the negligence of the corporation itself,
or of its superior officers or agents, or of its servants or employes. The
principle is that, in organized society, the rights of the individual must,
in some instances, be subordinated to the public good. It is better for the
individual to suffer injury without compensation than for the public to
be deprived of the benefit of the charity. The law has always favored
and fostered public charities in ways too numerous to mention, because
they are most valuable adjuncts of the state in the promotion of many of
the purposes for which the state itself exists. '"4 1
Elsewhere the Texas court said that charitable funds must be
devoted to charitable purposes, that the principle of respondeat
superior, if applied, would endanger the existence of charitable
4 145 S. W. at 1031.
,7 142 Tex. 179. 176 S. W. (2d) 749 (1943). reversing 172 S. W. (2d) 197 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943). noted in 22 Ttx. L Rav. 500 (1944). Accord: Scott v. Win. M. Rice
Institute, 178 S. W. (2d) 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). wri of error refused.
( " Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S. C. 197. 88 S. E. 649. 650(1916).
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institutions, that the guilty employee could be sued, and that the
law does not undertake to provide solvent defendants. It was indi-
cated that if defendant had been negligent in selecting or retaining
the employee causing the injury, defendant would have been
liable. Thus, the liability of charitable trustees or of a charitable
corporation in tort is the same whether plaintiff is a beneficiary
or a third party. A later decision rejected the argument that if the
charitable corporation is operating at a profit for a period of time,
its immunity from liability ceases."'
Two comparatively recent cases deny immunity from tort
liability where the alleged charitable corporation never functions
as such."' Plaintiffs sued for wrongful eviction from their room
and recovered actual and exemplary damages. The court declined
to give defendant "the benefits vouchsafed to charitable institu-
tions when it has never engaged in charity or benevolence of any
kind so far as the record shows, but is engaged in operating a
rooming house for profit just as would any individual or group of
owners engaged in the same business."5
It is of interest to note that the Foley case"2 actually involved
trustees who were erecting a building the income from which was
to be devoted to the maintenance and operation of a charitable
hospital. This point was not mentioned in the opinion of the Su-
preme Court and perhaps was not raised. The point was argued,
however, in the lower courts, and the court of civil appeals took
the position that the charitable trustees could not claim immunity
from liability:
49 Scott v. Win. Rice Institute, 178 S. W. (2d) 156, 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944),
write ol error relused: "Such contingent fund is as much a part of the assets of Rice
Institute as its general fund. and as much devoted to the purpose of the Institute. A
charity corporation does not have to be unfortunate or unskillful in the management
of its activities or finances in order to enjoy such immunity. And this case is governed
by the ruling in the Southern Methodist University case ......
50 Coefficient Foundation v. Edwards. 188 S. W. (2d) 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945);
Coefficient Foundation v. Kennedy. 188 S. W. (2d) 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
51 188 S. W. (2d) at 698.
62 Discussed at note 26 supra.
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"It will not do here to say... that it would thwart the purpose of this
endowment for a hospital, that is, would oppose the will of the founder
of the trust, to pay from its funds damages caused by the tortious and
negligent acts of his representatives, or their agents, for two reasons:
(1) The endowment fund itself was in this instance in no true or direct
sense actually involved; (2) the will of an individual may not exempt
property from the operation of the general laws of the land.
"The wrongful act here recovered for was merely an incident of the
construction by the executors, acting directly through their agent, of
an office building intended solely for money-making purposes, the con-
struction of which for those purposes was expressly contemplated and
authorized by the testator. Only its net income after deduction of the
cost of construction and the expenses of operation was to constitute a
fund for charity, and no reason is perceived for not regarding the liabil-
ity allowed as any other expense of construction. In all fairness and
justice it must be assumed that the testator himself anticipated the in-
curring of necessary cost, as well as reasonably probable incidental
injuries to others, in the erection of such a building in the heart of the
business district of a populous and busy city. '5 3
Speculation may be indulged whether or not the opinion of the
court of civil appeals is valid in the light of the Southern Method-
ist University decision. Football games in university-owned stadia
have commercial aspects in a very definite sense, and one may
question that a distinction can be drawn between such enterprises
and the operation of an office building. If there is no distinction,
then the Southern Methodist University decision forecloses the pos-
sibility of suit for tort committed in the course of any business a
charity may choose to operate. However, a distinction may be
drawn in that football spectacles are commonly regarded as part
and parcel of university life, the opinions of learned educators to
the contrary notwithstanding. There is* basis for this view in that
the program of health and physical education is promoted and the
university generally (including the learned educators) benefits
from the enriching effects of football. It may be that commercial
s3 239 S. W. at 254. Elsewhere it was emphasized that the office building "was
never to be used for and had no other connection with a hospital than to raise funds to
support it. and was built for the estate for that purpose .... " (At p. 253.)
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activities carried on at locations physically separate from the situs
of the charity and having no relation to the charity except giving
financial support are not enveloped with immunity from liability
for tort. To carry this thought one step further, it may be that
only the assets used in the commercial activities can be reached
by tort claimants.
The difference in tort liability of private trustees and charitable
trustees and the distinctions made among beneficiary, employee
and third party plaintiffs may be wiped out by the Texas Trust Act.
Section 2 defines "trust" for the purpose of the Act as an "express
trust only" and excludes certain transactions not material here.
Manifestly, express trusts include private and charitable trusts.
Sections 20 and 21, dealing with tort liability of trustees and their
right of indemnity, speak of "trusts" and make no mention of
"charitable trusts." The inference may be drawn that the sections
are applicable to both private and charitable trusts. Sections 20
and 21 are almost verbatim copies of Sections 13 and 14 of the
Uniform Trusts Act. 4 Omitted, however, from Sections 20 and 21
is the following provision which appears in both Sections 13
and 14:
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to change the existing law
with regard to the liability of trustees of charitable trusts for torts of
themselves or their employees."
A strong inference arises that the Texas Legislature intended, by
this omission, to make the sections applicable to charitable trusts.
Contrary arguments of great weight can be marshalled. The
rules governing tort liability affect property rights and have an
important bearing on the operations of charitable trusts. One
would expect that if so drastic a change were intended as to put
charitable and private trustees on the same footing, something
explicit to this effect would have been stated. The Texas Trust Act
is derived from the Oklahoma Trust Act, the Uniform Trusts Act,
54 9 U. L A. 714 (1941). See Vanneman and Rowley. The Uniform Trusts Act
13 UNV. oF CircINNATi L REV. 157 (1939).
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the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, the Uniform Principal and Income
Act, the Uniform Trustees Accounting Act, and the Restatement
of Trusts, and the first source is said to have contributed heavily."
The omission of the provision quoted above may not be significant
if one considers that the legislative process, involving study of
various uniform laws and the writing of a new act incorporating
parts of these laws, was a complicated one. The omission may not
have been as purposeful as at first face it appears.
Section 19 of the Texas* Trust Act, dealing with contract lia-
bility, provides expressly for charitable trusts. Notice of suit must
be given to the Attorney General and to any corporate beneficiary,
and they are given the right to intervene. The absence of any such
provisions in Sections 20 and 21 is conspicuous. One may infer
that these sections do not contemplate a tort situation involving a
charity. An explanation opposing the inference is that Section 21
was taken from Section 14 of the Uniform Trusts Act, and, of
course, the latter section said nothing about charitable trusts be-
cause a subdivision (quoted above) negatived the idea that the law
governing charitable trusts was being changed. This explanation
does not refute, however, that the remainder of Section 14 (which
is the whole of Section 21) was originally written not to apply to
charitable trustees. For example, Section 14.4 (Section 21D)
makes the trustee liable personally for any tort committed by him
or his agents or employees, and application of this provision to
innocent charitable trustees would be a surprising reversal of the
common law rule.
Charitable corporations are different in their legal nature from
charitable trustees. They are legal entities and are at once trustees
and beneficiaries of their assets. It is not clear that the Texas Trust
Act is applicable to them, although Section 4 includes in the defini-
tion of "trustee" corporate as well as natural persons. If Section
55 Moorhead, The Texas Trust Act 22 Tsx. L REv. 123 (1944). The Oklahoma
Trust Act. Okla. Acts 1941. c. 4. is based on the Uniform Trusts Act and omits the
provisions declaring that the existing law concerning liability of charitable trustees
for torts is to remain unchanged. No case has been decided on the question whether
or not the liability of charitable trusts for tort has been modified.
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21 applies to charitable trustees but not to charitable corpora-
tions, then the law will operate differently as to two institutions
which previously were treated alike. One may doubt that the Texas
Legislature intended to put charitable trustees and charitable cor-
porations on different bases in so far as tort liability is concerned.
Of course, if the Texas Trust Act is construed to apply to chari-
table corporations, the force of this argument is lost.
One may express the hope, for reasons stated earlier, that
charities will eventually be put on the same basis as private in-
dividuals with reference to tort liability. But it is doubtful that
the Texas Trust Act has effectuated this reform. One may hazard
the opinion that the tort liability of charities has not been altered
to conform With the law of private trusts because the Texas Trust
Act is not explicit to this effect, because such a change should not
be declared on the basis of omission from one of the sources of
the Act, and because on its face Section 21 is different from Sec-
tion 19 in failing to provide for charitable trusts. These reasons
have great force. The countervailing arguments and explanations
have strength, too, but some of them have the weakness of being
based on what may be termed speculative inferences from what
was done with sources of the legislation.
CONCLUSION
The quest for certainty in the law is constant and unending. No
one expects that all trust problems have been solved by the Texas
Trust Act. But a great many of them have. The provisions govern-
ing liability of trustees in contract and in tort have gone a long
way in settling rights and clarifying procedures. Unquestionably,
new problems will appear because the capacity of lawyers and
clients to involve themselves in new situations seems limitless. A
question which should have been left clear was whether or not the
liability of charitable trustees for tort should continue as it was
before the Texas Trust Act was passed. Charities are widespread,
and the wait probably will not be long before the question will be
presented to the courts. .
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